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Do we have a right to a jury trial in the UK?

With 2026 now underway, the disputes team at Sharpe Pritchard is looking ahead to potential changes to the litigation landscape this year. One that has already attracted significant media attention is the proposed introduction of legislation to limit the availability of jury trial in England and Wales, which the Justice Secretary (David Lammy MP) has confirmed will not be introduced before “the spring”.

This article will provide an overview of the proposed reforms to the jury system and the criticisms that have been levied against them, as well as discussing whether there is such thing as a ‘right to a jury trial’ in the UK.

The current status of jury trials in England and Wales:

Under the current law in England and Wales, criminal offences are divided into three separate categories (based on their severity), and there is a right to trial by jury in certain circumstances:

  1. Summary offences: no right to trial by jury (magistrates give verdict).
  2. Either way offences: magistrates give verdict OR defendants can elect trial by jury.
  3. Indictable offences: must be tried by a jury.

Proposals for reform:

The proposed reforms to our jury system have been prompted by a significant backlog of criminal cases in the court system (a backlog which has been estimated to consist of over 78,000 cases). Based on current figures, victims of serious crimes charged today are unlikely to see their case come to trial before 2030. The current situation clearly raises significant concerns for access to justice.

Retired Court of Appeal judge, Sir Brian Leveson, was asked by the Government to come up with a series of proposals to combat the backlog in the courts. Sir Brian Leveson published the first report of his Independent Review of the Criminal Courts in July 2025, in which he recommended a number of urgent reforms, including limiting jury trials to cases that carry a sentence of three years or more and stopping jury trials for serious fraud and some sexual offence cases.

Further to the publication of Sir Brian’s report, in December 2025 David Lammy MP announced that jury trials for crimes carrying a sentence of less than 3 years would be scrapped. The Justice Secretary said that the new system would get cases dealt with a fifth faster than jury trials, and therefore help to reduce the backlog weighing down the criminal courts.

Criticisms of proposed reforms:

The proposals to restrict trial by jury have provoked a tsunami of outrage and criticism amongst legal professionals (and, indeed, the wider public). Over 100 senior barristers, lawyers and KCs wrote to the justice secretary in November 2025, warning that these proposals are “an irremediable error” and will not fix the backlog.  A number of NGOs and charities have also spoken out against the reforms, including JUSTICE, a cross-party charity championing UK justice reform. The main criticisms of judge-only trials include the fact that:

  • There is no evidence to suggest that removing juries will actually reduce delays. Many say that the backlogs are not in fact caused by juries, but by court closures, crumbling infrastructure and legal aid cuts.
  • There is an increased risk of discriminatory outcomes in judge-only trials. Research suggests that limiting jury trials disproportionately impacts Black and Asian people, as well as other ethnic minorities. David Lammy’s own 2017 review of racial inequality in the justice system emphasised the importance of juries in making the system more legitimate, particularly for minority groups.
  • Removing juries would lead to reduced public confidence in the criminal court system, because the existence of juries is often viewed as a clear indicator to the public of justice being delivered by the people.

Right to a jury trial?

In light of the serious consequences of limiting trial by jury, it is worth considering whether and how this fundamental right is protected under the laws of England and Wales.

Clause 39 of the Magna Carta states that “[n]o free man is to be arrested, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any other way ruined, nor will we go against him or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land”. However, academic consensus is that this is not in fact referring to trial by jury. In any event, even if it were, the Magna Carta is purely symbolic and has no special status under the laws of England and Wales.

Both Sir Brian and David Lammy have rejected the ‘constitutional’ status of trial by jury.  In some respects, they are correct; there is no such thing as a ‘constitutional’ right in a strict sense in the UK, as we do not have a written constitution capable of formally protecting rights. In that sense, we stand in stark contrast to other jurisdictions, like the US and Canada, where the right to trial by jury is enshrined in written constitutions.

The European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”) (and in turn the Human Rights Act 1998 (the “HRA”), which incorporates the ECHR into domestic UK law) is another source that has the potential to offer a form of “constitutional” protection to the right to trial by jury. However, Article 6 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, makes no mention of juries. This omission is unsurprising, since the ECHR applies across Europe, where some countries have no tradition of juries.

Nevertheless, the fact that the right to trial by jury is not protected by a written constitution or by the HRA in the UK does not necessarily mean that it is not afforded some degree of protection. It does not have to be all or nothing. Some lawyers and scholars argue that there is such thing as ‘common law constitutional rights’ which reflect the fundamental values of our legal system and society. These include, for example, the right to vote, the right to demonstrate in public, the right to exercise free speech, and access to justice (see in particular Lord Reed’s description of access to justice as a “constitutional right” at paragraphs 65-66 of the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51).

These ‘common law constitutional rights’ are deeply embedded in the history and tradition of the UK and are a fundamental part of our unwritten constitution. It is certainly arguable that the right to trial by jury can be counted amongst them. In fact, it has been characterised as such for years. Trial by jury has been described as “the foundation of our free constitution” (Lord Camden (1714-1794)), “the lamp that shows that freedom lives” (Lord Devlin (1905-1992)) and “a highly valued part of our unwritten constitution” (Lord Hope in R v Connor and Mirza [2004] UKHL 2). These descriptions demonstrate the significance of this right and the role it plays as part of our unwritten constitution.

At paragraph 48 of his first report, Sir Brian Leveson acknowledges “the strength of feeling apparent from many criminal justice professionals…that for many the jury is the “gold standard” of adjudication in criminal trials.”. According to Sir Brian, “that perception cannot generate a “right” to a jury trial”.  However, it could be said that Sir Brian is underestimating the weight that this “perception” carries, and that his definition of what makes a right ‘constitutional’ is too narrow.

Although our jury system is not entirely immune to change, given the fundamental importance of jury trials in our legal system and society, any proposals to limit their availability should be approached with caution. The right to a jury trial may not be ‘constitutional’ in the strict sense, but the argument that it could still be considered constitutional in a looser, less rigid sense, is not without merit.

We are on hand to advise and assist individuals and entities who are interested in seeking guidance on this topic as it develops over the coming year. Please feel free to contact us using the contact details listed below.

This article is for general awareness only and does not constitute legal or professional advice. The law may have changed since this page was first published. If you would like further advice and assistance in relation to any of the issues raised in this article, please contact us today by telephone or email enquiries@sharpepritchard.co.uk.

Author(s)

Chloe McQuillan

Junior Associate

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Olivia Peake

Senior Professional Support Lawyer

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