29 June 2026
Read more about: Employment, Latest news,
22 August 2023
The Employment Appeal Tribunal has stepped in again in this controversial arena in this case and has ruled that “the freedom to manifest belief (religious or otherwise) and to express views relating to that belief are essential rights in any democracy”.
This is another decision in the fraught tug of war between employees claiming they have a right to express their gender critical beliefs irrespective of the offence those beliefs may cause to others in the workplace. This clash of protected rights is playing out across companies and organisations and employers are caught firmly in the middle of trying to manage the conflict.
The Forstater case put this issue firmly on the agenda in finding that employees should not be penalised for expressing their protected beliefs but until now employers have lacked guidance to assist them in determining what is a reasonable manifestation of a belief as opposed to comments or actions that cross the line and amount to harassment of other people with protected characteristics.
Kristie Higgs (“the Claimant”), a primary school worker was dismissed for gross misconduct in 2019 by Farmor’s School (“the School”) after sharing posts on Facebook concerning the teaching of LGBT+ issues in primary schools. The Claimant complained that her dismissal amounted to direct discrimination under Section 13 Equality Act 2010 and harassment under Section 26 Equality Act 2010 relating to her religious beliefs.
In 2019, the ET dismissed her claims accepting the School’s position that dismissal was not because of the Claimant’s protected beliefs but because her social media posts suggested that she could have homophobic and transphobic views.
The Honourable Mrs Justice Eady DBE (“Eady LJ”), when handing down her judgment on 16 June 2023, highlighted that case law established that the key consideration for the ET in this case should have been referred to the observations of Underhill LJ in Page[2] and concluded that the difficulty with the ET’s analysis here was whether there was a sufficiently close or direct nexus between the Claimant’s protected beliefs and her posts.
Eady LJ considered all the leading case law on how to assess this matter and concluded that there was a close and direct link between the Claimant’s conduct (in this case posts on social media) and her belief.
Therefore, the EAT allowed the appeal and referred the matter to a re-hearing to determine whether the School’s decision to dismiss was necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others, while recognising the essential nature of the Claimant’s rights to freedom of belief and freedom of expression.
This is a developing area of the law and we welcome Eady LJ’s guidance in her judgement on the factors to consider when dealing with the interaction of human rights and employment law. In her judgment, Eady LJ set out a series of structured tests for these sorts of situations which are taken almost entirely from human rights law but which seem to almost entirely replace the test for direct discrimination.
The test is as follows:
Unfortunately, the guidance may help Tribunals in assessing a claim of discrimination for expressing a protected belief but it does not necessarily help employers in managing the conflict arising when an employee exercises that freedom of expression or how an employer is supposed to manage this workplace conflict. This case seems to stretch the boundaries of direct discrimination and it would have perhaps been more helpful to employers to suggest that such arguments should be considered under indirect discrimination tests. That way, the employer has an opportunity to justify their decision making while recognising the rights of the employee.
This is a rapidly developing area of law, which juxtaposes the rights of different protected groups. Employers are well versed in assessing discrimination and bullying in the workplace but we have less experience of a situation where the law states that an employee can potentially express opinions in the workplace, which others may find offensive and bullying. Unfortunately, there is no obvious rule as to when a comment crosses the line from a reasonable expression of beliefs to a derogatory and unreasonable manifestation of those beliefs. This is an area where we expect a lot more case law to emerge but accept that our clients do not want to be at the forefront of creating new law.
We would advise that you take a proactive, transparent and practical approach to this issue.
Our team at Sharpe Pritchard has a wealth of experience on providing practical and pragmatic advice to employers. We can support you on auditing your existing policies, drafting and consulting on updated policies and training your HR and managers or flexing the policies to suit the situation. Please contact Julie Bann (jbann@sharpepritchard.co.uk) if you have any further queries.
This article is for general awareness only and does not constitute legal or professional advice. The law may have changed since this page was first published. If you would like further advice and assistance in relation to any of the issues raised in this article, please contact us today by telephone or email enquiries@sharpepritchard.co.uk.
[1] Mrs Kristie Higgs v 1) Farmor’s School 2) Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England [2023] EAT 89 EAT 89
[2] Page v NHS Trust Development Authority [2021] EWCA Civ 255
[3] Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700 [83]